Two Views: A "Russian Leviathan" Returns and "The Real Story" from Moscow

Will Russia have a new czar for life? What explains the national sentiment and current realities in Russia today? A new book from Sergei Medvedev, a Moscow-based political scientist–along with insights from Joshua Yaffa, the New Yorker‘s Moscow correspondent offer two perspectives:

“At first,” Mr. Medvedev writes, “Russia simply criticized the West for its moral degregation” and built “a protective perimeter.” But eventually it “decided to spread the borders of the empire, doing so, what’s more, on the same conservative and moralistic foundations it has used to create order at home.” In an astute one-sentence description of Mr. Putin’s credo, Mr. Medvedev labels him an “Orthodox Chekist with a slim volume by Ivan Ilyin.” This is a reference to Mr. Putin’s suddenly found religious belief; his pride in being the successor to the first Soviet secret police, the Cheka; and his fascination with the works of Ivan Ilyin (1883-1954), whom the historian Timothy Snyder has called the philosopher of “Russian fascism.”

‘The Return of the Russian Leviathan’ Review: A Lust for Suffering – WSJ

As Yaffa notes, making sense of the current situation requires focusing on the regular comprises made by many different people in doing their jobs and surviving inside the Russian State.

I recently found myself returning to an essay from 2000 by Yuri Levada, a pioneering Russian sociologist, called “The Wily Man.” The essay was Levada’s attempt to understand why so many pathologies of the Soviet era — the propensity for double-think and an adaptive, accommodating response to power — persisted so powerfully in modern Russia. In Levada’s telling, the wily man or woman “not only tolerates deception, but is willing to be deceived.” Indeed, says Levada, he even “requires self-deception for the sake of his own self-preservation.”

Over the last several years, guided by the prism of Levada’s wily man, I have studied the ways that many of Russia’s brightest figures — television producers, humanitarian aid workers, theater directors, Orthodox priests — have compromised themselves to accommodate to the state. Some of those compromises were venal and self-serving. But many started out with motives that were understandable, even admirable.

“The Real Story in American Politics” — NYT

An Inside Look at Diplomacy through Text

How do diplomatic negotiations look when you break them down into snippets…literally text messages between ambassadors and heads of state? This week we got a unique look–thanks to President Trump’s Ukraine scandal–and The Daily podcast from the New York Times–and it gives us the essence of the controversy.

One memorable exchange:

Michael Barbaro: So the fact that these two countries are negotiating, that’s not the problem …its like, in some ways, that’s what diplomacy is all about. Its the content, its what is on the table that is so unorthodox.

Julian E. Barnes: Absolutely. Countries, diplomats constantly do negotiations about what one side will do and what the other will do. But diplomacy is about negotiating for the national interest. And here, we have the Ukrainians negotiation for their national interests and we have the Americans negotiating for the interests of Donald Trump. … and his reelection.

The House Democrats leading the impeachment inquiry of President Trump called their first witness: Kurt Volker, a top American diplomat involved in the negotiations with Ukraine. We look at what Mr. Volker’s testimony — and the text messages he turned over to Congress — revealed about the inquiry’s direction. Guest: Julian E. Barnes, who covers national security for The New York Times. For more information on today’s episode, visit nytimes.com/thedaily. 

Background coverage: A text exchange appears to show a dispute among American diplomats over whether President Trump was seeking a quid pro quo from Ukraine.A second whistle-blower, said to have firsthand knowledge about the president’s dealings with Ukraine, has come forward.

Man in the Middle: Ambassador Huntsman in Russia

In a feature last year Jesse Hyde of the DesNews profiles Ambassador Jon Huntsman’s challenging role as the official representative of the U.S. to Russia.

 “My life isn’t terribly glamorous, just the gritty issues managing our most challenging account, along with our efforts in Syria, DPRK, Ukraine, arms control, etc. etc., the stuff of bread and butter diplomacy in the real world.”

Jon Huntsman

Did he write the anonymous NYT Op-Ed? Was his standing undercut by President Trump sending Sen. Rand Paul to deliver a message to Putin? What is life like in (a bugged) Spaso House? How can the U.S. hold Russia to account for election interference?

This piece covers a lot of big questions and sets the stage now as Huntsman has tendered his resignation in what many anticipate will be a return to Utah politics.

Józef Czapski, an essential Polish diplomat who opposed totalitarianism

If you don’t know who Czapski was, you must. An important artist capable of “bringing Proust to life,”  a national hero, and a public intellectual. He stands as an essential Polish writer and diplomat who sought to change the world through deep engagement with ideas (Proust), history, and sheer spiritual strength in dark times.

On his mission to determine what happened to Polands Reserve leaders during World War II. The answer? Katyń.

“Inhuman Land” is not an easy read. It is not meant to be. It is an exhaustive 435-page witness to official lies and evasions and the methodical murder of Poland’s ruling class, as well as the spiritual and material degradation Communism had wrought on millions of Soviet denizens. Czapski says he had “more and more precise information about those missing, and less and less hope that the Soviet authorities were willing to take an interest in these people’s fate.” Later, he recounts the multilateral betrayal of Poland by its “allies.” Nevertheless, he finds moral action even in the darkest corners of human history.

via Book Review: Shouldering the Century’s Burden – WSJ

Writing in the introduction to Inhuman Land, Timothy Snyder writes:

In communist Poland, as in the Soviet Union, it was illegal to write about the Katyn massacre. Under communism, Czapski’s name was on a special list of those not permitted to publish under any circumstances. Today Poland is sovereign, the truth about Katyn is known, and Czapski is receiving some of the attention he deserves. Some Polish politicians now err in the opposite direction, suggesting that an air accident that killed Poles traveling to commemorate Katyn in 2010 confirmed the eternal martyrdom of the Polish nation. Czapski’s position about Polish suffering was different: rather than treating the victimhood of other Poles as an authorization for falsehood, he turned his own suffering into a search for the truth about those who suffered more than he. He quoted Proust: “Perhaps a great artist serves his fatherland — but can only do so by seeing truth, which means forgetting everything else, including the fatherland.” [22]

Strobe Talbott on Totalitarianism

The word has been tossed around during recent elections, but it means something real. History helps most to get a sense of what totalitarianism really means.

From a notable issue of the NYTBR, former Deputy Secretary of State and Russia observer Strobe Talbott writes this short summary of Russian history–where the first two-thirds captures the connection between Stalin and Hitler and adds context to a well-known historical epoch.

A hundred years ago, a malignant form of governance, both modern and barbaric, slouched towards St. Petersburg to be born. As it grew, it swept across Eurasia, enveloping the largest territorial state on the planet and cloning itself elsewhere. As the decades passed, the monstrosity was given a name: totalitarianism.

via Stalin, Hitler and the Temptations of Totalitarianism – The New York Times

Inside the Mind of Sergei Lavrov

Russia’s top diplomat could take a number approaches in doing the job. In the case of Sergei Lavrov, despite his many successes, universal dislike and mistrust seems to be a constant companion, according to POLITICO’s Susan Glasser.

From two top Obama officials:

“He’s a nasty SOB. He would be relentlessly berating and browbeating and sarcastic and nasty. His job was to berate and beat and harass us and Secretary Kerry into conceding the Russian view. It wasn’t defeating America; it was that Russia can’t win if it has to compromise at all.”

“I don’t see him as zero-sum and suspicious of and averse to the West as Putin is,” said another former Obama official who sat in many meetings in recent years with Lavrov. “He believes more in at least tactical cooperation, at least in a broader context of strategic nonalignment. I think he did actually look for opportunities. I also think he plays to his bosses. So the extent to which he’s acerbic and nasty—that’s partly his personality and partly what he believes Putin and actual powers that be want to hear.”

Source: Russia’s Oval Office Victory Dance – POLITICO Magazine

Russia’s long game is becoming more readily apparent–and has been explored many times earlier–where it must turn weakness into strength.

“Free societies are often split because people have their own views, and that’s what former Soviet and current Russian intelligence tries to take advantage of,” Oleg Kalugin, a former K.G.B. general, who has lived in the United States since 1995, said. “The goal is to deepen the splits.” Such a strategy is especially valuable when a country like Russia, which is considerably weaker than it was at the height of the Soviet era, is waging a geopolitical struggle with a stronger entity.”

Source: Trump, Putin and the New Cold war – The New Yorker, Annals of Diplomacy, March 6, 2017 Issue

Lavrov is an essential diplomatic knight in this game.

In Glasser’s longer profile in FP,  she describes Russia’s “Minister No” as “no gray apparatchik” who dominated the Security Council, drank, “smoked like a chimney” and favorited Italian couture, even as he cites Prince Gorchakov as the Russian diplomatic model. Perhaps that is a key insight, where Russian nationalism drive the antagonism against the U.S., and is integrated into Lavrov’s diplomatic approach.

Breaking Down the Syrian Ceasefire

An excellent discussion parsing prospects, dimensions, and implications relating to the Syrian Ceasefire on today’s Diane Rehm Show.

The U.S. – Russian brokered ceasefire in Syria which went into effect at sundown on Monday is said to be, so far, mostly holding. Despite long odds for success Washington and Moscow hope their joint efforts can target the Islamic State and an Al Qaeda terrorist group while allowing for the delivery of humanitarian aid to thousands of increasingly desperate Syrian civilians: Join us for an update on the ongoing brutal conflict in Syria and prospects for this latest ceasefire agreement to hold.

Guests

• Liz Sly bureau chief, Beirut, Washington Post
• Jason Cone executive director, Doctors Without Borders
• Philip Gordon senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, former special assistant to the president and White House Coordinator for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf Region from 2013–15
• Faysal Itani resident fellow, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council.

A Walk in the Woods: A Lesson on Informal Negotiations

A few years ago when the New START Treaty was initially underway, a play was staged in an encore performance on the Hill.  This story that explores the heart of a successful negotiation during a time of Cold War tensions is apropos for our current milieu.

The Pulitzer, Tony, and Olivier award-Winning 1988 play, “A Walk in the Woods” by Less Blessing, tells the story of an accidental negotiation on a medium-range nuclear arms agreement by the US representative Paul Nitze and USSR diplomat Yuli Kvitsinsky. In 2010 it was re-staged at the American Ensemble Theatre in Washington, D.C.

Is the book better than the movie, er, the transcript better than the play? This lengthy interview explains:

At the time of your famous “walk in the woods,” the negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) in Europe had stalled. At the time, many people around the world, especially in Europe, believed that the U.S. wasn’t really interested in negotiating an arms control agreement with the Soviets. Source: Paul Nitze Interview — Academy of Achievement

Nitze, the namesake of Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies, was also involved in the 1986 arms summit in Reykjavik. He was perceived as an intellectual leader of the hawks by Democrats and seen by others in the Reagan administration as too much of a dove.

A BYU Kennedy Center reading of Richard Rhodes’ Pulitzer Prize-winning play Reykjavik is scheduled tonight on campus in Provo as part of our International Education Week 2015 celebration.

 

Mighty Mighty Putin?

Has Putin outflanked Obama geostrategically? Or, as Dmitry Adamsky wrote earlier this month in Foreign Affairs, is Russia now dangerously overextended through conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East? “Making waves is easier than controlling them. For Moscow, the main risk in Syria is overextension.”

Michael McFaul, Stanford political scientist and former US Ambassador to Russia writes that Putin is weak and explores how the US can do more to advance its grand strategy toward a safer world–and get a better Russia, as well:

The United States and Western allies should capitalize on Mr. Putin’s attention being diverted to Syria to deepen support for Ukraine. In return for progress on economic reform, especially anti-corruption measures, we can offer greater financial aid for infrastructure and social service programs.

And now is the moment to bolster the Ukrainian Army by providing more military training and defensive weapons.Elsewhere in Europe, NATO should station ground forces on the territory of allies most threatened by Russia. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine violated the NATO-Russia Founding Act and other treaties. In response, our NATO allies deserve credible new commitments from us.

Finally, we must continue to pursue long-term foreign policy objectives that demonstrate American leadership and underscore Russia’s isolation. Ratifying the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, closing a multilateral climate deal by the end of the year, deepening ties with India and managing relations with China are all parts of America’s grander strategy.

Source: The Myth­ of Putin’s Strategic Genius – The New York Times

How the Euro Crisis, Iranian Nuclear Deal and Ukraine are Connected

Good insight from Stratfor on how three seemingly unrelated events intersect:

Germany needs a deal with Russia to be able to manage an existential crisis for the eurozone; Russia needs a deal with the United States to limit U.S. encroachment on its sphere of influence; and the United States needs a deal with Iran to refocus its attention on Russia. No conflict is divorced from the other, though each may be of a different scale. Germany and Russia can find ways to settle their differences, as can Iran and the United States. But a prolonged eurozone crisis cannot be avoided, nor can a deep Russian mistrust of U.S. intentions for its periphery.

Both issues bring the United States back to Eurasia. A distracted Germany will compel the United States to go beyond NATO boundaries to encircle Russia. Rest assured, Russia — even under severe economic stress — will find the means to respond.

via The Intersection of Three Crises | Stratfor.