Tag Archives: diplomatic history

Long Live the State / The State is Dead

Two books from late 2014 make the case for why the State is in its final throes–but what a good ride it had. In a structural take on international relations, as compared to the theoretical view of power espoused by Moses Naim, Charles Maier looks backward in Leviathan 2.0: Inventing Modern Statehood and John Mickelthwait and Adrian Woodridge wonder about the future in The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State.

As Maier chronicles in his gripping account, the modern state wrapped itself in legal authority, harnessed technology, established markets, acquired wealth, and launched violent campaigns of territorial expansion. By the 1970s, the modern state had vanquished all the major alternative forms of political organization: a remarkable world-historical moment.

Micklethwait and Wooldridge cover some of the same ground. But the two editors of The Economist are more interested in the state’s future than in its past — and they are worried. In this clever and sharply argued book, they warn that the liberal democracies of the West have grown too big, a development they describe in evocative terms: “bloat,” “elephantiasis,” “omnipresent nanny,” the “supersizing” of the state. The unchecked growth of government, they claim, contributes to all the ills of today’s Western democracies: frayed social safety nets, demographic imbalances, fiscal crises, legislative gridlock, influence peddling, toxic partisanship. Micklethwait and Wooldridge argue that to fix those problems and fend off the challenge posed by the updated models of authoritarianism put in practice by the Chinese and others, Western democracy must be reinvented.

via Leviathan 2.0; The Fourth Revolution | Foreign Affairs.

Maier draws on history to show how how what we consider modern aspects of the state, “territorial integrity, highly developed governing structures, and technological prowess” are “historical anomalies–as Ethan Epstein writes in National Journal.

Not that this is new. Parag Khanna has been making this case in the literate press for some time, with the rise of NGOs coming to the scene most forcefully in the 1990s–now non-state actors in the media (bloggers), intelligence (Snowden), even terrorism (Bin Laden) are top of the list material for concern.

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Henry A. Kissinger as Negotiator

The myth of Kissinger is as great as the historical reality, if not larger. Whether you find him to be a scion of diplomacy or a scoundrel, or a little bit of both, how does he stack up as a negotiator? A recent paper by James K. Sebenius and Laurence A. Green do a little work by exploring three key negotiations, with a useful list of other activities in the appendix:

Following a brief summary of Henry A. Kissinger’s career, this paper describes three of his most pivotal negotiations: the historic establishment of U.S. diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, the easing of geopolitical tension with the Soviet Union, symbolized by the signing of the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (“SALT I”), and the mediation of the agreement on Sinai disengagement between Egypt and Israel. An appendix lists other important negotiations in which Kissinger played key roles. In a subsequent paper (forthcoming), the authors will examine these and other major events in which Henry Kissinger played leading roles in order to extract their most important insights into the principles and practice of effective negotiation.

via Henry A. Kissinger as Negotiator: Background and Key Accomplishments :: SSRN.

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Holly Case and the “Age of Questions”

Asking questions is more than a useful pedagogical tool. It used to chart the waves of history in big, seemingly important ways:

The 19th-century drive to settle or solve questions reveals something essential about them: They were construed as problems. The “question” had become an instrument of thought with special potency, structuring ideas about society and politics, and influencing the range of actions considered possible and desirable. This potency is evident in another creation of 19th-century commentators: the “definitive” or “final solution.” …

 

Today we “address issues” rather than “solve questions.” Perhaps this is why Putin’s reference to the “Ukrainian question” did not arouse much interest: We no longer live in an age of questions. Still, when The New York Times reports on the “French question” as though that country’s decline in prestige makes it the Ottoman Empire of our time, and a Latvian state official speaks of the necessity of facing the “Russian question,” and the Scottish referendum on independence from Britain has reignited both the “English question” and the “Catalonian question,” could it be that we are now on the cusp of a new age of questions? If so, we might do well to consider the first one.

via Interrogative Mode – The Chronicle Review – The Chronicle of Higher Education.

This “age of questions” that Holly Case writes about can be seen to shape current transformations “in the form of European Union enlargement, the Arab Spring, and Ukraine’s Maidan.” And in the latter case–the historical underpinnings have been mined by Putin even thought they work against his interests in Ukraine:

In 1915 a French diplomat asked the conservative Russian statesman Ivan Goremykin about the Ukrainian question. “There is no Ukrainian question!” Goremykin snapped. “From the national point of view, the Ukrainians are as Russian as the purest Muscovites. And from the economic point of view, the Ukraine is necessarily tied to Russia.” Russian liberals and leftist revolutionaries—who tended to believe there was such a thing as Ukrainians—were less dismissive. During the early stages of the Russian Revolution, in 1917—just months before Goremykin was killed by a street mob—the liberal novelist and poet Dmitry Merezhkovsky lamented, “We would like very much to say that there is no such thing as the Jewish, Polish, Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian question, that there is only one question—the Russian. Yes, we would like to, but we cannot; the Russian people have yet to earn the right to say that, and therein lies their tragedy.” To Merezhkovsky, national questions were remnants of the old czarist regime, lingering problems that the revolution would address.

 

Fast-forward nearly a century: It is no longer Russian imperialists but Ukrainian nationalists and patriots who insist that “there is no Ukrainian question, just a free, great Ukrainian nation.” It is safe to say that a question enjoys special longevity when those who deny its existence are as passionate and determined as those who profess its primacy. The struggle is therefore not between groups with opposing views on an issue so much as between groups that cannot agree on the terms of debate, or for which those terms are the debate.

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Using SIMS: Stop Blaming Students for Your Listless Classroom

Simulations and gaming approaches to learning can be powerful additions to forlorn general education history of civilization courses–just how IO simulations (MEU, MUN, Model Arab League) work for international relations.  For example, Reaching to the Past (RTTP) is a role-playing simulation where students play assigned roles using classic texts in the history of ideas, such as Darwin and the rise of Naturalism (1861-1864), Athens in 403 BC, or the trial of Galileo (1616-33). The results?

Over and over again he heard stories like the one told by Nate Gibson, an undergraduate who played a Reacting game on the French Revolution in a Western-civilization course at Dordt College in the early 2000s. Gibson said that, as the semester drew to a close, his professor foresaw that he would not have enough time to finish the game, and let students know that it would have to finish early. In response, the students proposed that class start 30 minutes early for the remainder of the semester—at 7:30 a.m. The professor agreed, and the game was allowed to run its course.

 

Recollecting that experience, Gibson recalled the difference between learning in that course and what his peers in other courses were experiencing. As he described to Carnes: “While my friends trudged off to their engineering, theology, philosophy, or business classes with this sense of apathy and frustration, I was rushing off to Western Civ, eager to see how the day’s session would unfold.”

 

Comments like that contrast so sharply with the dire picture we read about today’s students in so many articles on higher education. But as many of us who write about teaching and learning on college campuses would argue, sparking that kind of excitement in the classroom requires faculty members to let go of their nostalgic yearning for the idealized students of the past.

via Stop Blaming Students for Your Listless Classroom – Advice – The Chronicle of Higher Education.

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Booklist | Henry Kissinger, ‘World Order

Kissinger inveighs on statesmanship, ‘the craft of “attending” to [global] problems’ in his forthcoming book.  He has been attacked by liberals such as Christopher Hitchens, Gary J. Bass and Seymour Hersh as well as from conservatives. Even as it sounds a lot like my class lecture last week–I’m still looking forward to the massive tome:

The premise is that we live in a world of disorder: “While ‘the international community’ is invoked perhaps more insistently now than in any other era, it presents no clear or agreed set of goals, methods or limits. . . . Chaos threatens side by side with unprecedented interdependence.” Hence the need to build an order — one able to balance the competing desires of nations, both the established Western powers that wrote the existing international “rules” (principally the United States), and the emerging ones that do not accept them, principally China, but also Russia and the Islamic world.

This will be hard because there never has been a true world order. Instead, different civilizations have come up with their own versions. The Islamic and Chinese ones were almost entirely self-­centered: If you were not within the umma of believers or blessed with the emperor’s masterly rule, you were an infidel or a barbarian. Balance did not come into it. America’s version, though more recent and more nuanced, is also somewhat self-centered — a moral order where everything will be fine once the world comes to its senses and thinks like America (which annoyingly it never quite does). So the best starting point remains Europe’s “Westphalian” balance of power.

via Henry Kissinger’s ‘World Order’ – NYTimes.com.

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What’s to Gain from Gaming World History?

What if you could mix world history into a competetive strategy game where you control a civilization–and match it up against others, both real and imagined?  What if the game could be used to teach diplomacy and negotiation?

Sid Meier has done this, as have others.  To explain, Foreign Policy asked him to delve a little deeper and explain why, exactly, this game works:

FP: So what is the secret of Civ’s longevity?

SM: I think there is a combination of these grand ideas — war and peace, exploration, 6,000 years of history, great leaders — in a playable format. You can easily make a game with these elements that is unplayable or overwhelming. What we’ve tried to do is introduce these elements in a playable, manageable way, so that you as the player can master and experiment with them. Combining these things is the power of Civ.

via You Must First Invent the Universe.

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Anatol Lieven on the Solution for Peace in Ukraine

What needs to happen:

What is truly strange and terrible about this looming disaster is that all the leading players already know and agree about what the only solution can be, even if they disagree on the details and the timing: a federal Ukraine with elected regional governments and robust protection for regional interests. This, not further separation, is what Moscow is proposing; and this is what the Ukrainian interim president, Olexander Turchynov, has publicly hinted at for the Donbas. Although the rebels in Donetsk and other eastern cities have declared the Donetsk Republic and are now planning an independence referendum on May 11, many easterners, too, have indicated that they want some kind of federalization and not independence or annexation to Russia. As interviews published in Sunday’s New York Times make clear, even some rebel commanders themselves hope to keep Ukraine united.

via Ukraine: The Only Way to Peace by Anatol Lieven | NYRblog The New York Review of Books.

Lieven has been a voice of analysis (and reason) before, as he wrote in March why Ukraine should be a “bridge” rather than a “battlefield”:

The problem for the west is that while many of the pro-western Ukrainian forces are genuinely committed to western-style reforms, others are traditional nationalists who look to Nato and the EU for protection against Russia, without sharing mainstream liberal values. This may either make Ukraine’s integration into the west impossible or (as has already occurred in the case of Hungary) import into the EU forces which will ally with western European neo-fascist parties.

The problem for Russia in eastern and southern Ukraine is that a desire to keep the Russian language and close ties with Russia can co-exist with a desire for closer ties with the EU (though not with Nato). It is not at all the same thing as a desire simply to become part of Russia or even a subordinate member of a Russian alliance.

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What is realpolitik, really?

What do we mean when we say realpolitik, a term whose brand is ripe for a historical reinvention through careful understanding.  A number of things can be leaned in an enlightening essay by John Bew, namely that it doesn’t come from Machiavelli but rather via a German thinker in 1853.

According to the now newly remembered father of realpolitik:

Realpolitik was about the art of politics in the post-Enlightenment world. He wrote in an age of mass ideological awakening, economic transformation, social upheaval and international rivalry. The job of statesmen was not to remain studiously aloof from these forces but rather to manage and mediate them. For Rochau, too, patriotism and nationalism were not delusions and distractions from raison d’état but one of its most effective tools. A shared sense of national purpose was a “natural conciliatory force” between conflicting parties within a state. This was why “human judgement has been very firm regarding the view that it is the utmost sacrilege to question the national spirit (Nationalgeist), the last and most valuable guarantee of the natural order of society.” Any policies designed to break this spirit, or ignore it, “thereby descend to the lowest ranks of despicability.”

The implications for us today are everywhere, as the term is used synonymously with realism or power politics:

As periodically happens when the world becomes a more challenging place, a slew of new books on Niccolò Machiavelli have appeared on both sides of the Atlantic, including offerings by Jonathan Powell (Tony Blair’s former chief of staff) and Philip Bobbitt. Last December, in a review of four recent books on the Florentine statesman in the Atlantic, Michael Ignatieff announced the coming of the latest “Machiavellian moment” (a phrase introduced by the historian J. G. A. Pocock in 1975). By that he meant “an instance when public necessity requires actions that private ethics and religious values might condemn as unjust and immoral.” Other familiar heroes of realpolitik—such as Lord Castlereagh and Count Metternich (the focus of Henry Kissinger’s A World Restored) and Otto von Bismarck and George F. Kennan—are also enjoying a return to prestige.

This time around, realpolitik also has some new friends and unlikely advocates. The most liberal president to inhabit the White House in many years has been as realist as any of his predecessors in the conduct of foreign affairs, with a zero-sum security policy in which “interests” are paramount. Last May, the German weekly Der Spiegel ran an article declaring that President Obama was the heir to “Kissinger’s realpolitik,” quoting National Interest editor Jacob Heilbrunn to the effect that he “may even start speaking about foreign affairs with a German accent.” “Everybody always breaks it down between idealist and realist,” said Obama’s then chief of staff Rahm Emanuel in April 2010. “If you had to put him in a category, he’s probably more realpolitik, like Bush 41 . . . you’ve got to be cold-blooded about the self-interests of your nation.”

via The Real Origins of Realpolitik | The National Interest.

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Using History to Make Policy

Twenty years ago a book titled The Uses of History by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May was published based on a course at Harvard’s Kennedy School . Some considered that this approach illustrate how “the ‘obvious’ has too often been ignored, with unfortunate results.”  In other words, there may be a historical analogue to every current situation0–but we must analyze the similarities, differences, and implications.

It appears that we still haven’t learned much–speaking specifically about the Ukraine crisis.  (Andrew Bacevich explains.)

Policymakers and foreign policy leaders need more training in history, according to Stephen Walt:

U.S. President Barack Obama (and his successors) would be better off with fewer policy wonks, pollsters, and lawyers in their inner circles, and with a few more well-trained historians instead. (I’m a political scientist, by the way, so I’m not promoting my own discipline here.) And if I had a magic wand and could transform how aspiring foreign policymakers were trained, studying lots of history would be mandatory while some of the other subjects students are now forced to study would become optional.

My advice: If you have your heart set on a career in international affairs, reading plenty of history and learning how historians think would be excellent preparation. Given the paltry comprehension of history currently on display in Washington, D.C., such knowledge would make you nearly unique, and thus uniquely valuable.

via Condemned to Repeat It.

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Booklist | ‘The Brothers’ by Stephen Kinzer

A one-sided view of two brothers, a polemic of the duo, the diplomat and the spy, both of whom shaped the US from the fifties through the Cold War:

During World War II, Allen returned to the Bern embassy, putting his mistress’s psychoanalyst, Carl Jung, to work for the Allied cause, recruiting a senior official of the German foreign office, tapping into the ill-fated conspiracy to kill Hitler, and playing a part in the surrender of the Nazi armies in Italy. Foster had a quieter war, helping to write the United Nations Charter and serving as an adviser at the U.N. founding conference in San Francisco. He had been Thomas E. Dewey’s foreign-policy adviser when the latter ran against FDR in the 1944 election.

The fateful culmination, in Mr. Kinzer\’s view, came when, “with the Dulles brothers as his right and left arms, [Dwight D. Eisenhower] led the United States into a secret global conflict that raged throughout his presidency.” By bringing us such memorable acts as the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran and Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in Guatemala, Mr. Kinzer implies, the brothers gave us in the end the allegedly warlike, unjust, hated America we live in now.

“The Brothers” is a long book pieced together largely from secondary sources. Mr. Kinzer’s compilation of clandestine capitalist mischief rolls inexorably onward from first page to last, seldom pausing to speak good of the dead. This approach is one-sided and somewhat monotonous, at times even obsessive, but not exactly unfair. After all, the positive side of the story has often been told, and those who see merit in the brothers’ work are unlikely to be swayed by Mr. Kinzer’s fervent rebutta

via Book Review: ‘The Brothers’ by Stephen Kinzer – WSJ.com.

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