Prepping to Negotiate with North Korea

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What advice would @mickeybergman, one of the people responsible for negotiating with the DPRK to release Otto Warmbier, give to President Trump ahead of his tete-a-tete with Kim Jung-Un?

In an interview with FP’s Sarah Wildman, print editor, and Dan De Luce, chief foreign policy correspondent, Bergman explores his experiences with non-state actor diplomacy in the grey area between states and individual actors.  And based on his past experience working with North Korean interlocutors, he explores strategies that would be important for any negotiation with North Korea.

For example, Bergman observes that the Koreans make three fundamental assumptions going into a negotiation:

  1. The world is out to get us. (Consider regional history from Japan, China, South Korea, as well as the U.S.)
  2. We are surrounded by giants. (China, Russia, and the U.S.)
  3. We need an asymmetric three to maintain our way of life (nuclear weapons)

In PostWorld this week, he writes that one tactic to expect from the North Koreans is a feint that could shut down negotiations:

In the 1990s, when one of us, then-congressman Richardson, was an unofficial envoy, his U.S. delegation extended an offer of food aid to North Korea during one break in arms-control discussions as a gesture meant to encourage their counterparts to return to the talks. The North Koreans publicly rejected the aid, insisting that they didn’t need it, but then quietly accepted it, nonetheless. For show, they briefly reopened negotiations, but they weren’t serious. Nothing happened, and they blamed us for the impasse. A typical North Korean dodge.

via WaPo, Kim Jong Un won’t give up his nukes. Trump should meet with him, anyway.

Discussions could take much longer than just a one meet up between two highly visible heads of state:

In 2016, negotiating on behalf of Otto Warmbier’s family in Pyongyang, the other one of us, Mr. Bergman, received a flat “no” from the North Koreans on a proposal to bring Otto home during the official portion of a meeting. Minutes later, during an unofficial conversation, one of his counterparts casually commented: “There is a saying in my country: it takes 100 hacks to take down a tree.” The North Koreans negotiate with patience and deliberation, something Trump must take into account.

How will Trump do, the self-described master negotiator? We’ll have to wait and see–and hope for the best.

 

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Three Strategies for Framing Your Negotiation

How do you apply framing in making an offer? Take a look at this from Harvard PON’s blog, including another post on 5 strategies to try.

Research by Max Bazerman, Margaret Neale, and Tom Magliozzi finds that people tend to resist compromises—and to declare impasse—that are framed as losses rather than gains. Suppose that a company offers a recruit a $20,000 increase over her current salary of $100,000. This offer same offer of $120,000 is more likely to appeal to her than an offer framed as a $30,000 decrease from her request of a $150,000 salary. Stressing what the other party would gain rather than lose is an important form of framing in negotiation.

Source: Framing in Negotiation – PON – Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School

The Athenian Model of International Relations 

 

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The way that a diplomat looks at the world matters. Civilizations and, today, nation-states, have differing views on the way the world works. A Chinese approach to diplomacy takes a different time-horizon than many Western countries, who tend to be focused on the short-term.

But what happens when you see the world as a business deal, or a zero-sum negotiation? What are the moral implications? Writing in the New York Times, columnist David Brooks draws a line between the values that shape our worldview–with an eye toward a few of the U.S. administration’s leading figures.

Good leaders like Lincoln, Churchill, Roosevelt and Reagan understand the selfish elements that drive human behavior, but they have another foot in the realm of the moral motivations. They seek to inspire faithfulness by showing good character. They try to motivate action by pointing toward great ideals.
Realist leaders like Trump, McMaster and Cohn seek to dismiss this whole moral realm. By behaving with naked selfishness toward others, they poison the common realm and they force others to behave with naked selfishness toward them.
By treating the world simply as an arena for competitive advantage, Trump, McMaster and Cohn sever relationships, destroy reciprocity, erode trust and eviscerate the sense of sympathy, friendship and loyalty that all nations need when times get tough.

via David Brooks in The New York Times, The Axis of Selfishness

Pascal on Persuasion

We learn from the 17th Century physics and philosopher, Blaise Pascal that when it comes to the art of persuasion, “slipping through backdoor of [someone’s] beliefs” is a surefire way to change minds. (Thanks, Brain Pickings).

In his book, Pensées , he writes:

People are generally better persuaded by the reasons which they have themselves discovered than by those which have come into the mind of others.

In other words…use their words to your advantage. (If this sounds like one of the classic definitions of diplomacy, you may be right.)

Put simply, Pascal suggests that before disagreeing with someone, first point out the ways in which they’re right. And to effectively persuade someone to change their mind, lead them to discover a counter-point of their own accord. Arthur Markman, psychology professor at The University of Texas at Austin, says both these points hold true.

“One of the first things you have to do to give someone permission to change their mind is to lower their defenses and prevent them from digging their heels in to the position they already staked out,” he says. “If I immediately start to tell you all the ways in which you’re wrong, there’s no incentive for you to co-operate. But if I start by saying, ‘Ah yeah, you made a couple of really good points here, I think these are important issues,’ now you’re giving the other party a reason to want to co-operate as part of the exchange. And that gives you a chance to give voice your own concerns about their position in a way that allows co-operation.”

Source: To tell someone they’re wrong, first tell them how they’re right — Quartz

What Axelrod and the Prisoner’s Dilemma Teaches about Human Nature

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We ran the Harvard Program on Negotiation case whose dull title (“Oil Pricing Exercise”) belies the fireworks that tend to erupt in a Prisoner’s Dilemma simulation. It was the first time that I have used this version and it seems to be an extended version of my preferred one hour version–with the benefit of drawing out the negotiations for up to three hours, although the students didn’t seem to take it as seriously as we hoped.

The case is historically exemplified by the Cuban Missile Crisis (another case that I run midway during the semester). A few of the key issues that always emerge in discussions and case debriefs include:

  • trust, and the dissolution of it as the exercise progresses
  • conflict styles and strategies
  • dealing with escalation (e.g., self-fulfilling prophecy, entrapment)
  • “defecting” (e.g., backstabbing–with its ethical and tactical implications)

In the case debriefing I read about Robert Axelrod at the Ford School (University of Michigan) who ran a computer simulations, which was something new that I hadn’t heard about previously.

In 1980, Robert Axelrod, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, held a tournament of various strategies for the prisoner’s dilemma. He invited a number of well-known game theorists to submit strategies to be run by computers. In the tournament, programs played games against each other and themselves repeatedly. Each strategy specified whether to cooperate or defect based on the previous moves of both the strategy and its opponent.

via CS.Stanford.edu

The result was Axlerod’s “Tit for Tat” strategy, recommended in the Harvard Case debriefing notes, which recommends choosing to cooperate initially and then follow the opponent’s previous move for the remainder of the game. Much was made of Axelrod’s computer simulation–even though his conclusions the source of ongoing discussion.

You can find critics. Ken Binmore, author of Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract, takes issue with any strategy that removes human proclivity for evil:

In brief, the simulation data on which Axelrod supposedly bases his conclusions about the evolution of norms is woefully inadequate, even if one thought that his Norms Game were a good representation of the Game of Life in which real norms actually evolve. One simply cannot get by without learning the underlying theory. Without any knowledge of the theory, one has no way of assessing the reliability of a simulation and hence no idea of how much confidence to repose in the conclusions that it suggests. It does not follow that the conclusions on norms and other issues which Axelrod offers in his Complexity of Cooperation are without value. He is, after all a clever man who knows the literature of his own subject very well. But I do not think one can escape the conclusion that the evidence from computer simulations that he offers in support of his ideas has only rhetorical value. His methodology may table some new conjectures that are worth exploring. But such conjectures can only be evaluated in a scientific manner by running properly controlled robustness tests that have been designed using a knowledge of the underlying theory.

via JASSS (book review)

Even so, Axelrod’s strategy has been useful and has attracted attention from evolutionary biology (Joshua Plotkin) and the guys at RadioLab, who wondered about altruism and global strategy. (Listen to the entire story, below, for an amusing retelling). The takeaway? We can see how an Old Testament, “eye for an eye” mentality came from biology and has an evolutionary (and mathematical) basis for understanding human experience.

https://www.wnyc.org/widgets/ondemand_player/radiolab/#file=%2Faudio%2Fxspf%2F104010%2F

The Khan Academy has its own version of a Prisoner’s Dilemma lecture, if you prefer an old-school refresher on the the MOOC lecture.

Inside Negotiations for a Bipartisan Immigration Deal

A great article by Alec MacGillis in the NYT Magazine on how the Republicans and Democrats came together after Mitt Romney’s loss to Barack Obama–with a historic window to negotiate an immigration deal. Who were the players. How did the deal come together. And how it fell apart.

Three years ago, the G.O.P.-led Housewas close to reaching a compromise on immigration — one that might haveneutralized the issue for the 2016 election.This is the inside story of what went wrong.

Source: How Republicans Lost Their Best Shot at the Hispanic Vote – The New York Times

‘Gaps of Trust’ With Russia Bar a Syrian Truce, Obama Says 

Have you ever participated in a “trust fall” exercise? If so, you get the point–trusting your partners is important. It appears that trust doesn’t really exist much between the US and Russia–and that has big implications for the ongoing Syrian civil war.

“Given the gaps of trust that exist, that’s a tough negotiation, and we haven’t yet closed the gaps in a way where we think it would actually work,” Mr. Obama declared at a news conference at the end of a Group of 20 summit meeting in Hangzhou, China.He did not describe the points of contention. Other officials have said they involve technical issues like how to staff checkpoints in combat areas. But the checkered history of Syrian cease-fires — the United States agreed to one with Russia in February, only to watch it unravel weeks later — has left the president deeply leery.

Source: ‘Gaps of Trust’ With Russia Bar a Syrian Truce, Obama Says – The New York Times