Additional Reading on the Cuban Missile Crisis

Want to dig deeper into the causes, processses, and various possible outcomes from the crisis? (Remember that case studies, by their nature, have more than you can ever read or digest….that is part of the game.)  But assuming you want to learn more….First, its helpful to know that this is an oft-studied case in schools of public policy–so much so that Eliott Cohen wrote a much noted article in The National Interest in 1986 arguing “enough!” [Google book version here]

Further, take this worthy rebuttal to Cohen in this review of Michael Dobbs’ book and discussion of the demythologizing of the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as a brief by Dobbs for the US Institute of Peace [PDF].  (The latter argues several reasons for the continued study of this case–including the fact that it demonstrates how personality in leadership matters.  With a different president we very well would have obtained a different result.)

Now, go back from the future and consider these sources, thanks to Future State:

Primary Sources

Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff. CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. Washington, DC, Central Intelligence Agency, 1992. http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/cubamis/book1.pdf

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. VI, Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1996. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/volume_vi/volumevi.html

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. X, Cuba, 1961-1962. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1997. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusX/index.html

U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1996. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusXI/index.html

Secondary Sources

Allison, Graham T. and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999.

Fursenko, Aleksandr and Timothy Naftali. One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997.

May, Ernest R. and Philip Zelikow, eds. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1997.

Nash, Philip. The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.

National Security Archive. “The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: The 40th Anniversary.” http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/

Paterson, Thomas G. Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Thirteen Days (movie). Dir. Roger Donaldson. New Line Cinema, 2000.

News Analysis – Russia’s Leaders See China as Template for Ruling – NYTimes.com

A Security Council reverse crush?

In truth, the Russians express no desire to return to Communism as a far-reaching Marxist-Leninist ideology, whether the Soviet version or the much attenuated one in Beijing. What they admire, it seems, is the Chinese ability to use a one-party system to keep tight control over the country while still driving significant economic growth.

It is a historical turnabout that resonates, given that the Chinese Communists were inspired by the Soviets, before the two sides had a lengthy rift.

via News Analysis – Russia’s Leaders See China as Template for Ruling – NYTimes.com.

Former Soviet Sphere Cries Wolf? (or Not)

Is Ukraine in danger from Russia?

Several days ago the big-selling ‘Segodnya’ ran this story on “Ukrainian intellectuals’” appeal to the world to save Ukraine from Russia. I’ve translated some portions below:

They call on the USA, Great Britain, France and China, the guarantors of the Budapest memorandum, to take part in an International conference in order to provide security guarantees for Ukraine.

The members of the intelligentsia note: “The Russian leadership have consciously taken a course on the dismantling of the current security system, the key direction of which has become the aim of subordinating Ukraine in order to fulfill the geo-strategic interests of Russia”….

According to their appeal, “the consequence of such a strategy is the rapid escalation of stress in bilateral relations. Unprecedented aggravation has taken the form of information warfare against Ukraine”.

“In Russian society Ukrainians are presented as the enemy, and Ukraine is labelled as the main destabiliser of relations between the European Union and Russia,” they add.

via Ukrainian intellectuals warn of Russian threat | GlobalPost.

Another GlobalPost perspective heads the other direction, reviving a discussion of the recent past:

Untold inches of newsprint and buckets of ink have since been devoted to Russia’s seemingly neo-Soviet foreign policy under Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev. And all this may be true: Medvedev has spoken of a region of “privileged interests” that encompasses the former Soviet states.

But a strange thing has happened since the Georgian war — someone forgot to tell the ex-republics that The Bear Is Back. While attention has been focused on the Kremlin’s new aggressiveness, Bishkek, Tashkent, et. al., have all quietly gone their own way.

via Former Soviet Republics Buck Russian Influence

Book Review – ‘The Hawk and the Dove – Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War,’ by Nicholas Thompson – Review – NYTimes.com

Meet two giants in the field of U.S. foreign policy, Nitze and Kennan, or the “Hawk” and the “Dove.”  Herein originated the policy of containment, as well as a vigorous debate:

Who was right? Did the United States put too much stock in military preparedness, unnecessarily antagonizing the Soviets while guaranteeing that the East-West rivalry would play out in the sole arena where Moscow could compete? Or did Americans act sensibly in response to a clear and present danger of Soviet aggression? Nicholas Thompson insists in “The Hawk and the Dove,” his thoroughly engrossing, if not altogether satisfying, dual biography of Nitze and Kennan, that both men had valid points.

“Each was profoundly right at some moments and profoundly wrong at others,” Thompson asserts of their long, inter­twined careers as statesmen, policy makers and public intellectuals. The two men “pulled in different directions” but “complemented each other” and, Thompson suggests, contributed in distinct ways to America’s victory in the cold war. They even managed to remain friends despite their differences.

via Book Review – ‘The Hawk and the Dove – Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War,’ by Nicholas Thompson – Review – NYTimes.com.

New Direction for Russian/Polish Relations?

As Russia tries to pry Poland away from its western allies, an apology for a past pact may work:

The relative warmth stood in contrast to Polish frustrations with the United States; Mr. Tusk has taken pains to play down the fact that President Obama was represented at the memorial ceremonies by his national security adviser, which many Poles saw as a snub.

Poland’s traditionally close relations with Washington are already being tested by reports that the Obama administration is reviewing the Bush administration’s plan to deploy parts of its antiballistic missile shield in Poland, as well as the Czech Republic, two Eastern European states eager for the American presence, particularly as Russia has grown more aggressive internationally.

via Putin Praises Poland for Bravery in World War II – NYTimes.com.

To give you a sense of the past antipathy among both nations, consider this article from 2005, where an advisor to Putin believes “Poles talk about Russians the way anti-Semites talk about Jews.”

Russian Professor Predicts End of U.S. – WSJ.com

The end of the United States….literally?

“There’s a 55-45% chance right now that disintegration will occur,” he says. “One could rejoice in that process,” he adds, poker-faced. “But if we’re talking reasonably, it’s not the best scenario — for Russia.” Though Russia would become more powerful on the global stage, he says, its economy would suffer because it currently depends heavily on the dollar and on trade with the U.S.

Mr. Panarin posits, in brief, that mass immigration, economic decline, and moral degradation will trigger a civil war next fall and the collapse of the dollar. Around the end of June 2010, or early July, he says, the U.S. will break into six pieces — with Alaska reverting to Russian control.

Consider the source:

Prof. Panarin, 50 years old, is not a fringe figure. A former KGB analyst, he is dean of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s academy for future diplomats. He is invited to Kremlin receptions, lectures students, publishes books, and appears in the media as an expert on U.S.-Russia relations.

But it’s his bleak forecast for the U.S. that is music to the ears of the Kremlin, which in recent years has blamed Washington for everything from instability in the Middle East to the global financial crisis. Mr. Panarin’s views also fit neatly with the Kremlin’s narrative that Russia is returning to its rightful place on the world stage after the weakness of the 1990s, when many feared that the country would go economically and politically bankrupt and break into separate territories.

France helps out the US with Russia

See how it works, so far…the nuanced step back by Russia:

At a meeting in Nice hosted by the President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, Mr. Medvedev backed away from the bellicose speech he gave last week, just hours after Mr. Obama won the United States presidential election. On Friday, the Russian leader argued instead that all countries “should refrain from unilateral steps” before discussions on European security next summer.  [NYT]

Ukraine’s external (economic) & internal (political) crisis

If the battles in Georgia earlier this year were all leading to Ukraine, this begs the question as to what the West and Russia are scrambling to protect:

But now, confronted by the global financial crisis, the new Ukraine is facing the single biggest test of its stability, and its leaders, by most accounts, seem to be close to failing.

Yulia V. Tymoshenko, the prime minister, and Viktor A. Yushchenko, the president, onetime political allies, are now locked in a bitter power struggle that has paralyzed the state, leaving it without a leader at precisely the time it most needs one.

Even as the West bends to help it, with the International Monetary Fund pledging an emergency $16.5 billion loan last month, it barely pulled itself together to meet the conditions for the money. Mr. Yushchenko, intent on getting rid of Ms. Tymoshenko, is trying to force early elections for December. To make sure the elections come off, his party spent most of last week trying to slip a campaign finance clause into the legislation that was required for the loan.

Russia’s Interests

Why does Russia support keeping the U.S. mandate to stay in Iraq?

Russia Teaches the U.S. about Afghanistan

Many stories over the past month trending towards increasing problems in Afghanistan.  The Russians try to provide some perspective, as well.

In fact, it is precisely because of a belief that the Soviet past may hold lessons for the American future that a talk with Mr. Kabulov is valued by many Western diplomats here. That is a perception that has drawn at least one NATO general to the Russian Embassy in Mr. Kabulov’s years as ambassador, though the officer involved, not an American, showed no sign of having been influenced by what he heard, Mr. Kabulov said.

“They listen, but they do not hear,” he said with another wry smile.