Envoy May Take Disarmament Plan to Pyongyang – NYTimes.com

Progress with the Koreas?

Any visit of a U.S. envoy to the reclusive North is trumpeted by the state's propaganda machine as a victory for leader Kim, whose military-first rule and nuclear arsenal forced the United States to come to Pyongyang with concessions.But analysts said President Barack Obama's administration may have the upper hand due to the state of the North's broken economy. Fresh U.N. sanctions, imposed as a result of the North's nuclear test in May, and U.S. Treasury action that has targeted its finances have further hurt Pyongyang.”The real problem with denuclearization is both parties are just testing the waters to see who will act first,” said Chon Hyun-joon, an expert on the North at the South's Korea Institute for National Unification.

via Envoy May Take Disarmament Plan to Pyongyang – NYTimes.com.

Iran and the Limits of International Organizations?

To get back up to speed on Iran and the multilateral approach to its alleged nuclear weapons program–first, there was the slap–backed with the P-3’s blessing:

In a blow to Iran, the board of the U.N. nuclear agency on Friday overwhelmingly backed a demand from the U.S., Russia, China and three other powers that Tehran immediately stop building its newly revealed nuclear facility and freeze uranium enrichment.

via Diplomats – Iran Censured at UN Nuclear Meeting – NYTimes.com.

And now, intransigence:

Iran angrily refused Sunday to comply with a demand by the United Nations nuclear agency to cease work on a once-secret nuclear fuel enrichment plant, and escalated the confrontation by declaring it would construct 10 more such plants.

Both countries, historically opposed to sanctions, had voted in favor of a resolution by the I.A.E.A. demanding that Iran stop work on a formerly secret enrichment plant. By refusing to accept that resolution, one senior administration official said, “Ahmadinejad may be doing more to assemble a sanctions coalition than we could do in months of work.”

The White House spokesman, Robert Gibbs, said of Iran’s declaration: “If true, this would be yet another serious violation of Iran’s clear obligations under multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions, and another example of Iran choosing to isolate itself.”

via A Defiant Iran Vows to Build Nuclear Plants – NYTimes.com.

So now what? Back to sanctions?  Military action?  Something new?

A Christian View of Non-Proliferation

Thanks to PBS’s newsweekly site for the interesting blog discussion on religion & international affairs, raising an interesting question about whether a non-proliferation policy stance should be inherently Christian?

The Two Futures Project (2FP) is a movement of American Christians for the abolition of all nuclear weapons. We believe that we face two futures and one choice: a world without nuclear weapons or a world ruined by them. We support the multilateral, global, irreversible, and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, as a biblically-grounded mandate and as a contemporary security imperative.

Our change strategy is based around the creation of a nonpartisan, conscience-driven, enduring majority of Americans who are committed to a nuclear weapons-free world. By joining together with one voice of Christian conscience, we seek to encourage and enable our national leaders to make the complete elimination of nuclear weapons the organizing principle of American nuclear weapons policy. We join in this work to the glory of God.

via About 2FP « Two Futures Project.

 

News Analysis – Iran’s Politics Stand in the Way of a Nuclear Deal – NYTimes.com

Why won’t Iran deal on the nuclear material?  It may not be a clever negotiating stance, but rather, the implications of a complicated political mix in domestic and foreign politics:

At the center of Iran’s problems is President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who said recently that Iran should accept the deal, saying that his tough stance in past years had finally forced the West to accept implicitly Iran’s right to enrich uranium.

Mr. Ahmadinejad, however, deeply alienated both reformist and conservative political leaders since his disputed re-election as he tried to consolidate power and marginalize his rivals. Neither side is eager to see him and his nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, take credit for resolving the nuclear issue and, with that, thawing relations with the United States, the analysts said.

“Even a potential deal that serves Iran’s overall interests can be scuttled due to Iran’s highly factionalized political environment,” said Alireza Nader, an Iran expert with the Washington office of the RAND Corporation, a research organization.

via News Analysis – Iran’s Politics Stand in the Way of a Nuclear Deal – NYTimes.com.

The Case for the CTBT

This past May we took a group of BYU Kennedy Center students to the United Nations “City” in Vienna, Austria to learn about the challenges involved with nuclear non-proliferation.  Our group–the innaugural Global Diplomacy tour–met with officials and even a Utah State University intern at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization.  As one of the newest IO’s on the global governance scene, we observed through a plate glass window into the room where scientists monitor any sign of nuclear testing around the world using the latest technology.  Little did we know, within a few days of our visit, the DPRK would announce a nuclear test, verified by the CTBTO with a 4.52 Richter scale signal at 00:54 GMT.

The history of testing is a fascinating and awe-insipiring threat to humankind.  What is the appropriate response to a threat that could destroy the world?

Here–as with many other shared threats–a global response may be most effective.  Consider this position argued by Jessica Tuchman Mathews, president of the Carnegie Endowment:

The positive reason to ratify is that giving up nuclear tests enhances security.

Since 1999, we have learned that a nonproliferation system designed against threats from states must be rebuilt to eliminate loopholes and to contain new threats from commercial groups and from terrorists.But 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the non-nuclear states feel that the weapons states haven’t upheld their end of the NPT bargain: to move toward disarmament. They are, therefore, unwilling to discuss necessary new restrictions until they see movement. Ratifying the test ban is a necessary first step.

via This Time, Ban the Test – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

You can review the global scorecard in this great GoogleMap mashup that shows treaty status by country as well as test sites.

Another view by John Mueller of FP.com—no need to be alarmist.  Nukes aren’t that big of a deal:

However, it is increasingly clear that the Soviet Union never had the slightest interest in engaging in any kind of conflict that would remotely resemble World War II, whether nuclear or not. Its agenda mainly stressed revolution, class rebellion, and civil war, conflict areas in which nuclear weapons are irrelevant. Nor have possessors of the weapons ever really been able to find much military use for them in actual armed conflicts. They were of no help to the United States in Korea, Vietnam, or Iraq; to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan; to France in Algeria; to Britain in the Falklands; to Israel in Lebanon and Gaza; or to China in dealing with its once-impudent neighbor Vietnam.

In fact, a major reason so few technologically capable countries have actually sought to build the weapons, contrary to decades of hand-wringing prognostication, is that most have found them, on examination, to be a substantial and even ridiculous misdirection of funds, effort, and scientific talent.

What Shapes Sanctions | The New Republic

Think back to the debates about the benefits of talking to our enemies. The moment of truth may have arrived:

We are at the moment where we can finally determine the goals and efficacy of Obama’s engagement strategy. And, of course, the shape of our evaluation of that policy will be determined by Iran’s response to the American’s good faith approach. Engagement has been portrayed as a strategic departure–and if it results in a grand bargain that halts the nuclear program, it will have been just that. But if Iran counters our sincere proposals with bad faith, engagement will look altogether different. Then the policy will have been a mere way station on a route to a new policy. Barring a surprise in the upcoming talks, it now seems that engagement will become a prelude to bolstered sanctions. But thanks to the initial American offer of engagement, whatever new policy emerges will be more credible, more legitimate in the eyes of others.

To maximize the idea of sanctions as a credible threat if talks fail, the U.S. has favored a multilateral approach. Yet, there is a clear tradeoff. The wider the international coalition, the more the U.S. will end up making deals that will limit the scope and timing of sanctions. The U.S. has been visibly courting Russia because of Moscow’s ties with Tehran. Moreover, it views Russia as key to building a coalition for sanctions within the UN Security Council.

via What Shapes Sanctions | The New Republic.

Or perhaps something even more dramatic according to Harvard professor and security strategist (quoted by WaPo ) Graham Allison–a Cuban Missile Crisis-type showdown?

Pyongbang! | Foreign Affairs

Kudos on the article title, as well as some negotiating ideas to address North Korea–in light of their most recent missile test:

• First, the United States should enforce Resolution 1718 and reimpose economic sanctions, including financial sanctions to target entities that finance ballistic missile development…
• Second, Obama should consider restoring North Korea to the list of state sponsors of terrorism, using the revelations of Pyongyang’s help to Damascus’s nuclear program as justification…
• Third, he should instruct relevant agencies to start a quiet but serious dialogue with China and South Korea about how to deal with a post-Kim leadership, reaching out along with Japan to potential new leaders in Pyongyang by offering them the prospect of security assurances and economic assistance in return for constructive policies.

The Dear Leader Photoshopped? (update)

According to the Times Online, “Rather than a genuine photograph, there were growing suspicions last night that the image released by the North Korean authorities may possibly be the result of digital trickery.”

The NYT echoes this idea in their reportage:  “The fact that the North is going to such lengths to demonstrate that Kim Jong-il is O.K. is, ironically, a sign that his health is not normal,” Mr. Ryoo said.

The reason for all this digital imagery?

Other analysts said the timing of recent reports about Mr. Kim was linked to the American presidential election.  “Kim Jong-il wants to show that he is in control and that he has no problem being a partner of dialogue with the United States,” said Kim Yong-yun, a North Korea expert at Dongguk University.

Its important, of course, because–as we cannot forget–North Korea went nuclear and thus, demands attention.  See Mike Chinoy’s new-ish book on the topic.  [Reviews].

Update:  Who’s (Jang) in Charge?

The brother-in-law of North Korea’s Kim Jong-Il has become even more powerful since Kim fell sick, officials and analysts say, with some believing he is effectively standing in for the supreme leader.  The influence of Jang Song-Taek has become greater than ever since Kim was reportedly hit by a stroke, Cheong Seong-Chang, of South Korea’s private Sejong Institute think-tank, said Tuesday. “Jang is apparently in charge of receiving orders from Kim and channelling them (to state agencies),” he told AFP.  A senior South Korean intelligence official went further, saying Jang was acting like a stand-in in day-to-day state affairs.