What do the Palestinians hope to obtain this coming week at the UN? Daniel Levy of the New American Foundation notes:
Even at this late stage it is unclear exactly which U.N. option, if any, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (for it is the PLO that is still the diplomatic-political address for the Palestinians) will pursue. That should not be such a surprise — opacity is part of any negotiation and last minute decisions are the bread and butter of international diplomacy, in this case compounded by the uncertainty and absence of a clear strategy on the part of the Palestinian leadership. Their U.N. options basically fall into three baskets: do nothing, go for membership at the Security Council, or go for an upgrade at the General Assembly.
via A Palestinian Autumn in New York — What to Expect at the U.N. | NewAmerica.net.
And Robert Danin goes a step further, acknowledging that the Palestinians will gain something–but at what cost and what does this do for the diplomatic process?
Ironically, this effort, if successful, could achieve the very position Palestine could have attained long ago at a much lower price. Phase II of the 2003 Quartet Roadmap for Peace offered the option of creating “an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders” as a stepping stone to a negotiated permanent final-status agreement. The Palestinian leadership long rejected this option, fearing that that establishing a state prior to resolving all outstanding final status issues with Israel would leave them unresolved in perpetuity. Now they have effectively reversed course, hoping for just such an outcome. Only now, the Palestinians are pursuing this goal outside of any international diplomatic effort, rather than within one.
via The UN Vote and Palestinian Statehood | Foreign Affairs.
Keep in mind what a vote in the GA means (and what it doesn’t):
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is not a legislature. If it passes a resolution, then this does not necessarily change anything in international law or international affairs. This doesn’t mean that its votes are always inconsequential (although many are). The UNGA is the only place where all states formally and publicly state their positions on controversial issues. This can influence other processes, especially if the resolution is supported by many states and the most powerful ones. For example, the UNGA does not have the formal authority to designate statehood. Nevertheless, if a vast majority of states, including most of the powerful ones, vote in favor of a resolution that recognizes Palestine as a state, then other entities are more likely to be persuaded by the claim of statehood than if the resolution would squeak by with a bare majority.
All of this is a long-winded way of saying that it really matters not just whether a UN resolution on Palestinian statehood will pass but how many and which states will vote in favor of it.
via The Palestine Vote: Who Will Vote How? — The Monkey Cage.
David Rothkopf, ever the realist, doesn’t see the strategy as working:
Over the weekend a keen, very experienced observer of the region who has what would be generally viewed as a pronounced a pro-Palestinian tilt to his views called Abbas, “hopelessly incompetent, corrupt and obsessed primarily with where his next dollar is coming from.” As I noted, this was a supporter. He was struggling with why Abbas might seek to take his statehood resolution to the U.N. Security Council where it will certainly be vetoed rather than bring it to the U.N. General Assembly where he is equal assured of a resounding victory when the votes are tallied. Yes, the latter path grants only observer status, but the former grants nothing at all except the chance to give a few more indignant speeches.
My friend speculated on a few reasons. Foolishness was one. A second, not much more charitable, was that he wanted center stage, a last hurrah, that might propel him into his post-political life well. If it did and that also helped the overall cause by getting some supporters on the record and highlighting divisions among the great powers, all the better. It also might be that he recognizes that actually winning in the General Assembly might then shift the focus to the hollowness of his victory if it comes, as it will, for a nation without borders its most nearest neighbor will agree upon?
via David Rothkopf | FOREIGN POLICY.
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