Additional Reading on the Cuban Missile Crisis

Want to dig deeper into the causes, processses, and various possible outcomes from the crisis? (Remember that case studies, by their nature, have more than you can ever read or digest….that is part of the game.)  But assuming you want to learn more….First, its helpful to know that this is an oft-studied case in schools of public policy–so much so that Eliott Cohen wrote a much noted article in The National Interest in 1986 arguing “enough!” [Google book version here]

Further, take this worthy rebuttal to Cohen in this review of Michael Dobbs’ book and discussion of the demythologizing of the Cuban Missile Crisis, as well as a brief by Dobbs for the US Institute of Peace [PDF].  (The latter argues several reasons for the continued study of this case–including the fact that it demonstrates how personality in leadership matters.  With a different president we very well would have obtained a different result.)

Now, go back from the future and consider these sources, thanks to Future State:

Primary Sources

Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton, 1969.

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff. CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. Washington, DC, Central Intelligence Agency, 1992. http://www.cia.gov/csi/books/cubamis/book1.pdf

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. VI, Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1996. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/volume_vi/volumevi.html

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. X, Cuba, 1961-1962. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1997. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusX/index.html

U.S. Department of State. Office of the Historian. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1996. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusXI/index.html

Secondary Sources

Allison, Graham T. and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 1999.

Fursenko, Aleksandr and Timothy Naftali. One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997.

May, Ernest R. and Philip Zelikow, eds. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1997.

Nash, Philip. The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997.

National Security Archive. “The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: The 40th Anniversary.” http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/

Paterson, Thomas G. Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Thirteen Days (movie). Dir. Roger Donaldson. New Line Cinema, 2000.

President Obama Announces More Key Administration Posts 09/24/09 | The White House

I’m not sure how we missed this, but one more thing that John Dinkelman knows—and he does know everyone.  There are now three LDS U.S. ambassadors abroad, in China, Jordan, and now a Special Envoy on North Korea.  For those of you who have already made the wise decision to participate in the BYU Washington Seminar, you know Bob (now, “your excellency”) and Kay, who is equally impressive.

Robert R. King, Nominee for Special Envoy on North Korean Human Rights Issues, with the rank of Ambassador, Department of State

Bob King has worked on Capitol Hill for the last 25 years, and for 24 of those years he was Chief of Staff to Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA). He was concurrently Staff Director of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives (2007-2008), Democratic Staff Director of the Committee (2001-2007) and held various professional staff positions on the Committee since 1993. After Congressman Lantos’ death, Mr. King continued as Committee staff director for Chairman Howard L. Berman (D-CA) for one year. As Staff Director of the Committee, Mr. King supervised committee staff on all aspects of its legislative, oversight and investigative work. Mr. King was heavily involved in the planning and conduct of Congressman Lantos’ human rights agenda, including the establishment and supervision of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, which recently became the Tom Lantos Congressional Human Rights Commission. Prior to his service on Capitol Hill, Mr. King served on the National Security Council Staff as a White House Fellow during the Carter Administration. He was Assistant Director of Research and Analysis at Radio Free Europe in Munich, Germany. Mr. King has also taught courses in U.S. foreign policy and international relations at the University of Southern California German Study Program, Brigham Young University Study Abroad, American University in Washington, D.C., New England College, and other institutions. He is author of five books and some 40 articles on international relations issues. He earned a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a B.A. from Brigham Young University. Among his honors and recognitions, he received the Knight’s Cross Order of Merit of the Republic of Hungary. He is a Member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

via President Obama Announces More Key Administration Posts 09/24/09 | The White House.

 

 

Are you planning to apply?

Diplomatic Memo – Europe Still Likes Obama, but Doubts Creep In – NYTimes.com

We have come a long way, baby, when French President Sarko says the following:

“I support America’s outstretched hand. But what has the international community gained from these offers of dialogue? Nothing but more enriched uranium and centrifuges.”

via Diplomatic Memo – Europe Still Likes Obama, but Doubts Creep In – NYTimes.com.

Whether its the right direction–that is another matter up to political debate.  As the previous post on Sec State Clinton shows, doubts are growing about the limits/wisdom of the much discussed ‘dialogue’ approach.

Maoist Rebels Widen Deadly Reach Across India – NYTimes.com

 

 

Contrast the fact that almost as many Indian security officers have been killed over the past four years as coalition forces in Afghanistan during the same timeframe–and you see the beginnings of a major problem for India:

If the Maoists were once dismissed as a ragtag band of outdated ideologues, Indian leaders are now preparing to deploy nearly 70,000 paramilitary officers for a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign to hunt down the guerrillas in some of the country’s most rugged, isolated terrain.

via Maoist Rebels Widen Deadly Reach Across India – NYTimes.com.

A Tale of Two Headlines

Consider the two leads introducing Secretary of State Clinton’s initiatives in the Middle East Peace Process:

• Clinton Denies Easing Pressure on Israel Over Settlements – NYTimes.com.
• Clinton Reasserts Her Role in U.S Foreign Policy:  Secretary of State Takes on a Complicated Mission in the Mideast as Obama’s ‘Engagement’ Diplomacy Comes Under Pressure – WSJ.com

What does that tell you about media influence, perspectives, and modes of interpretation?  How about after you read the stories?

News Analysis – Iran’s Politics Stand in the Way of a Nuclear Deal – NYTimes.com

Why won’t Iran deal on the nuclear material?  It may not be a clever negotiating stance, but rather, the implications of a complicated political mix in domestic and foreign politics:

At the center of Iran’s problems is President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who said recently that Iran should accept the deal, saying that his tough stance in past years had finally forced the West to accept implicitly Iran’s right to enrich uranium.

Mr. Ahmadinejad, however, deeply alienated both reformist and conservative political leaders since his disputed re-election as he tried to consolidate power and marginalize his rivals. Neither side is eager to see him and his nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, take credit for resolving the nuclear issue and, with that, thawing relations with the United States, the analysts said.

“Even a potential deal that serves Iran’s overall interests can be scuttled due to Iran’s highly factionalized political environment,” said Alireza Nader, an Iran expert with the Washington office of the RAND Corporation, a research organization.

via News Analysis – Iran’s Politics Stand in the Way of a Nuclear Deal – NYTimes.com.

Booklist | The Essence of War – The Chronicle of Higher Education

If you would study peace, it makes sense to start with war.  And if you would study the conflict among nations, you must look at Clausewitz.

Alarmed by war, Clausewitz made two fundamental contributions to its study. First, he insisted on the importance of thinking over doctrine; and second, he believed that such thinking could be taught.

The great military theorist–author of the oft-cited book, On War, recognized that conflict was an essential part of statecraft and inexorably linked to the rise and fall of civilziations.

Clausewitz valued history, taught and wrote about it as something vital for making sense of the world, but never thought history was enough. To study war the Clausewitz way, a warrior must go to war. But I would like to believe that On War makes casualties no longer necessary. What is painfully learned in battle might instead be learned from Clausewitz.

via The Essence of War: Clausewitz as Educator – The Chronicle Review – The Chronicle of Higher Education.

Booklist | Why We Cooperate – The MIT Press

This new book looks at the biology and psychology of human cooperation–an important concept premise for multilateralism:

Drop something in front of a two-year-old, and she’s likely to pick it up for you. This is not a learned behavior, psychologist Michael Tomasello argues. Through observations of young children in experiments he himself has designed, Tomasello shows that children are naturally—and uniquely—cooperative. Put through similar experiments, for example, apes demonstrate the ability to work together and share, but choose not to.

As children grow, their almost reflexive desire to help—without expectation of reward—becomes shaped by culture. They become more aware of being a member of a group. Groups convey mutual expectations, and thus may either encourage or discourage altruism and collaboration. Either way, cooperation emerges as a distinctly human combination of innate and learned behavior.

via Why We Cooperate – The MIT Press.

Pakistan’s Baghdad Bob | Foreign Policy

 

Today, Baghdad Bob might have found a successor in the form of Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas,the director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations, which handles media relations for the Pakistani armed forces. In a recent Washington Post column, David Ignatius celebrated Pakistan’s new determination in confronting the Taliban, quoting Abbas saying that the ongoing offensive in South Waziristan brings an end to the Pakistani government’s thinking that “somehow we’ll be able to manage them, co-opt them, bring them on board.”

Statementslike that are music to American policymakers’ ears. But somehow, it seems like we’ve heard all of this from General Abbas before. In less than two years, the general has provided the media with a fairly impressive list of promises, assertions, and projections — none of which have more than a tenuous basis in reality. Here are a few of his greatest hits.

via Pakistan’s Baghdad Bob | Foreign Policy.